(A) Incorrect — the distance and angle are defensible. What fails is tamper resistance, the third thing 2.4.B.1 tells you to weigh and the easiest to skip.

(B) Incorrect — trays in frame show what was taken, not who took it. The door-facing angle is the right call; it just has to survive contact with the adversary.

(C) Incorrect — this is true, and it is still true after the mount is fixed, so it is not the weakness this note introduces. Badge attribution comes from the reader’s log, not from the camera.

(A) Incorrect — I is right, but so is II. The one-badge-one-entry attribution is exactly what makes an entry log worth reading after an incident.

(B) Incorrect — II is right, but I is not wrong. Stopping an uninvited follower and stopping a consenting one are both inside what a vestibule does.

(D) Incorrect — and internally inconsistent. If no unauthorized person could reach the vault door, there would be nothing for the log in II to narrow down.

(A) Incorrect — a stationary post is the right form for one concentrated high-value item, but four controls already watch that door, so the officer adds less there than anywhere else.

(C) Incorrect — the tamper switch already reports any attempt on that cabinet, and a finding’s severity ranking is not what decides guard placement. Coverage gaps are.

(D) Incorrect — this re-covers the most instrumented space in the building. A patrol’s value is the time pressure it puts on an adversary, and a fixed published interval over ground that sensors already hold turns that pressure into a timetable.

(B) Incorrect — more cameras produce more footage that is overwritten on the same 72-hour clock. Coverage is not the binding constraint in this stem.

(C) Incorrect — resolution improves footage you still have, and 30 days after the theft there is none of it left to improve.

(D) Incorrect — monitoring a feed is genuinely valuable and it is the right answer to a different question. A shortage discovered at a monthly count was not visible to a watcher weeks earlier.

(A) Incorrect — a contact and a camera answer different questions, and this is a detection row, not an identification row. The contact does the job the row claims for it.

(B) Incorrect — that corridor is unstaffed overnight, which is exactly when an unobserved closet entry is likeliest. Routing to a staffed service is the stronger choice, not the flaw.

(C) Incorrect — 90 days already outruns the interval in which anyone would notice the server missing, so retention is not the field that fails here.

(A) Incorrect — sensitivity governs whether movement registers, not whether anyone acts on it. In a low-traffic vault it mainly buys the false alarms 2.4.B.2 warns about.

(C) Incorrect — a second sensor addresses coverage, which the stem never says is failing, and its activations land in the same unread inbox.

(D) Incorrect — an audible alarm deters, and it may shorten the intrusion, but it dispatches nobody. A warned intruder in an unstaffed building still leaves unchallenged.