Model Response: Risk 1 — Ransomware: Likelihood 4 (High — already happened once, industry targeting is increasing), Impact 5 (Critical — $2.1M cost, full operational shutdown). Score: 20/25. Risk 2 — Insider theft: Likelihood 3 (Moderate — insider threats are always present but require specific motivation), Impact 3 (Moderate — manifest data is sensitive but not as costly as full system encryption). Score: 9/25. Risk 3 — Power outage: Likelihood 3 (Moderate — depends on infrastructure reliability and weather), Impact 4 (High — $87.5K/hour during peak season adds up quickly). Score: 12/25. Priority order: Ransomware (20) > Power outage (12) > Insider theft (9).

Model Response: Risk 1 — Ransomware: Mitigate + Transfer. Deploy EDR, network segmentation, and offline backups (mitigate). Purchase cyber insurance covering ransomware losses (transfer residual risk). Risk 2 — Insider theft: Mitigate. Implement DLP to detect bulk data downloads, enforce role-based access controls limiting manifest access to need-to-know staff, and enable audit logging on all manifest queries. Risk 3 — Power outage: Mitigate. Install UPS for immediate failover and a diesel generator for sustained outages. Test failover monthly during non-peak periods.

Model Response: Total investment: $275K + $180K = $455K/year. ALE: $840K/year. Net benefit: $840K - $455K = $385K/year in expected risk reduction. The investment is financially justified because it costs $455K to avoid $840K in expected annual losses.

Residual risks: (1) Zero-day ransomware that evades EDR detection. (2) Backup corruption if the attacker gains persistent access before backups rotate. (3) Insurance claim denial if Ironclad fails to meet policy compliance requirements. (4) Novel attack techniques that evolve beyond current controls. These residual risks should be formally accepted by the board after documented review, with a commitment to reassess annually and adjust controls as the threat landscape evolves.